The MoJ-Saudi Memorandum of Understanding – a timeline

This is a timeline of (most of the) information in the public domain about the UK Ministry of Justice’s “Memorandum of Understanding” with the Saudi Arabian government, signed on 11 September 2014.

12 November 2013

The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee publishes a detailed report on the UK’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.  It includes the following conclusion:

“25.  The UK is well-placed to provide legal and judicial reform assistance and we recommend that the government make this constructive contribution a focus of its human rights work with Saudi Arabia. Despite the considerable challenges, promising steps appear to have been taken toward providing constructive assistance but these must be converted into solid and reportable programmes. The UK should also encourage the development of Saudi Arabia’s consultative systems, and we particularly welcome initiatives such as parliamentary exchanges in this regard.”

It also lists the MOUs and treaties between the UK and Saudi Arabia then in force.

February 2014

The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is referred to in the UKTI Security Exports Strategy of 2014 (host web page):

“Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and National Offender Management Service (NOMS) Supports capacity for design and prison build across overseas prison services. Provides justice assistance consultancy services alongside learning and development opportunities and interventions via the Prison Service training college… NOMS will work with UKTI to identify trade opportunities arising from this work… NOMS will work with UKTI to identify trade opportunities arising from this work.”

March 2014

According to a 2015 FCO report, the Home Office sign a Memorandum of Understanding with Saudi interior ministry:

In March, the Home Secretary, Theresa May, signed a MoU with her Saudi counterpart to help modernise the Ministry of the Interior, which draws on UK expertise in the wider security and policing arena. This will complement work going on between the College of Policing and a range of Saudi security bodies.

August 2014

According to the December 2014 mid-year report (see below), The MoJ’s JSi submit “a £5.9m proposal to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Finance to conduct a training needs analysis across all the learning and development programmes within the Saudi Arabian Prison Service”.

10 September 2014

Chris Grayling, the then Lord Chancellor, visits Saudi Arabia.

11 September 2014

The following are tweeted from the UK embassy in Saudi Arabia’s Twitter Account:

There does not appear to have been a contemporaneous press notice or media release.

30 September 2014 (or 21 January 2015, date unclear)

An update to the FCO’s “Country of Concern” 2013 Report for Saudi Arabia states:

“…on 10 September, the Secretary of State for Justice, Chris Grayling, visited Saudi Arabia and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Saudi Arabian Minister of Justice. This MoU is a mechanism for dialogue and exchange of expertise on justice, legal and human rights matters. Mr Grayling raised human rights concerns during his visit, and met the Human Rights and Legal Committees of the Majlis al Shura, and the National Society for Human Rights.” 

December 2014

In the so-called “mid-year report” of the Ministry of Justice, covering April to September 2014:

“The Secretary of State visited Riyadh in September 2014 to sign a Memorandum of Understanding on Judicial Cooperation, to build upon the existing bilateral justice relationship, promote UK legal services in Saudi Arabia and raise awareness of the upcoming Global Law Summit. He also met UK lawyers with offices in Riyadh. Discussions were also held on judicial cooperation, King Abdullah’s reform programme, and human rights issues.”

There is also in that report the first express mention of JSi in any official MoJ document –

 Just Solutions international (JSi), is the commercial brand for the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) promoting products and services to international justice markets.

In August 2014, JSi submitted a £5.9m proposal to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Finance to conduct a training needs analysis across all the learning and development programmes within the Saudi Arabian Prison Service.

23 January 2015

The MoJ press office provides the following answer to a question:

Q) Can I please have a copy of the MoU signed between the Secretary of State and Saudi Arabia?

A) This is a shared document with the Saudi government so we are not in a position to publish it at present.

25 January 2015

Someone sends to the MoJ a Freedom of Information request as follows:

“Please provide an electronic copy of the September Memorandum of
Understanding on Judicial Cooperation between the United Kingdom
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which the Lord Chancellor and
Secretary of State signed in Riyadh on behalf of the United
Kingdom, including any appendix and all schedules, annexes and
enclosures.”

19 February 2015

The MoJ initially responds to the FoI request as follows:

“I can confirm that the department holds the information you have asked for, and it may be subject to a qualified exemption.

In this case, the information you are seeking may be exempt under Sections 27(1) and 27(2) of the Act as it relates to the conduct of international relations.

In line with the terms of this exemption in the Freedom of Information Act, I have to consider whether it would be in the public interest for us to provide you with the information requested. However, I have not yet reached a decision on the balance of the public interest in this case.

Under Section 10(3) of the Act, I am able to extend the statutory time limit of 20 working days where the information held may be exempt under a qualified exemption, and I require more time to consider the balance of the public interest when deciding whether to disclose the information or not.”

12 March 2015

The FCO’s “Country of Concern” Report 2014 for Saudi Arabia notes the following:

“There were significant changes in the justice sector. On 10 September, the Secretary of State for Justice, Chris Grayling, visited Saudi Arabia and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Saudi Arabian Minister of Justice, Dr Muhammed Abdul-Kareem al-Issa. This should act as a mechanism for dialogue on human rights issues and an exchange of expertise on justice and legal matters. It follows up on the work undertaken by Dr al-Issa to implement a largescale reform programme aimed at judicial modernisation in Saudi Arabia.”

The same report mentions the JSI contract bid:

“To assist in the justice sector, the UK National Offender Management Service, through their commercial arm, Just Solutions international, submitted a bid for a contract to conduct a training needs analysis across all the learning and development programmes within the Saudi Arabian Prison Service.”

18 March 2015

The MoJ releases its decision to not disclose the MoU in response to the FoI request.  The MoJ’s reasoning is as follows:

“I wrote to you on 19 February, indicating that I needed further time to consider the terms of your request. I have now completed my considerations.

I can confirm that the department holds the information you have asked for, and I consider it is subject to a qualified exemption.

In this case, in my view the information you are seeking is exempt under Sections 27(1) and 27(2) of the Act as it relates to the conduct of international relations.

A UK Government Department is not obliged to provide information requested if its release would prejudice international relations. Specifically, the document which you have requested is one that is confidential between the UK Government and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This type of document is covered by the provisions of Section 27(2) of the Act, which deal with confidential information obtained from another State. In addition, as the disclosure of confidential material obtained from another State would be likely to prejudice future relations between the UK Government and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Section 27(1) of the Act is also engaged.

In line with the terms of these exemptions in the Act, I have nevertheless to consider whether it would be in the public interest for me to provide you with the information requested, despite the exemptions being applicable. In this case, I have concluded that the public interest favours withholding the information you have requested.

When assessing whether or not it is in the public interest to disclose the information you have requested, I have taken into account the following factors:

Public Interest considerations favouring disclosure

• Disclosure would support the wider Government commitment to transparency and may encourage greater understanding of the general public about the Ministry’s policies, activities and agreements with foreign nations.

• The information in question relates to how UK Government Departments interact with foreign Governments to share knowledge and best practice. The UK’s agreement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been subject to debate in the media and a level of public interest, to which disclosure of the information could assist in a wider public understanding of the nature of the agreement.

Public Interest considerations favouring withholding the information

• The document was agreed to be confidential between the two Governments. As the UK Government engaged in the preparation and signing of this document on a confidential basis, I judge it reasonable for the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to expect that the UK Government would not share its contents with a third party. My judgment is that to do so unilaterally might harm future relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and may discourage them from entering into agreements or sharing information with the Department in future. In my view this risk extends across all areas of Government.

• It is important for non-UK Governments or bodies to know that they can discuss and agree issues with the UK Government in an atmosphere of confidentiality. Releasing information provided in confidence without agreement may damage the wider public interest beyond the information in the scope of this request, by making it less likely that other Governments or bodies would share confidential information in the future. As such, it is of prime importance for the UK Government to maintain consistency in this area. The potential impact of disclosure has, as I intimated earlier, wider implications than the relationship between the UK Government and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in this particular context.

I have therefore reached the view that, on balance, the public interest is better served by withholding this information under Section 27(1) and 27(2) of the Act.”

By way of background, Section 27 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 provides:

“27 International relations.

(1)  Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice—
(a)  relations between the United Kingdom and any other State,
(b)  relations between the United Kingdom and any international organisation or international court,
(c)  the interests of the United Kingdom abroad, or
(d)  the promotion or protection by the United Kingdom of its interests abroad.

(2)  Information is also exempt information if it is confidential information obtained from a State other than the United Kingdom or from an international organisation or international court.

(3)  For the purposes of this section, any information obtained from a State, organisation or court is confidential at any time while the terms on which it was obtained require it to be held in confidence or while the circumstances in which it was obtained make it reasonable for the State, organisation or court to expect that it will be so held.  […]”

17 April 2015

The refused FoI request is referred to the Information Commissioner’s Office.

At some point between this reference and 10 August 2015, the MoJ in correspondence with the ICO shifts its position from disclosure being “likely” to have a prejudicial effect to that it would have a prejudicial effect on the relationship between the two Governments …. to the detriment of the United Kingdom” [emphasis in original].

Also in April 2015, the MoJ submit their final bid for the Saudi prisons contract (see here).

21 July 2015

The MoU is mentioned a number of times by opposition MPs (including Jeremy Corbyn) in the Westminster Hall debate on Saudi Arabia.

29 July 2015

The MoU is referred to in paragraph 10 of the MoJs’ defence document in a judicial review application before the High Court.

10 August 2015

The ICO decides against ordering the MoJ to disclose the MoU.  The full decision is here, but it is too long to quote in full in this timeline.

The key paragraphs of the decision are:

“27. Having duly considered the arguments put forward by MoJ, and having viewed the withheld information, the Commissioner is satisfied that there would be a real and significant risk of prejudice if the withheld information were to be disclosed. Acknowledging that prejudice to the relationship between the UK and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – in the way predicted by MoJ – would occur, the Commissioner accepts that, in the circumstances of this case, the higher threshold of likelihood is met.

28. He therefore finds the exemption engaged in relation to the information withheld by virtue of section 27(1)(a) and has carried this higher level of likelihood through to the public interest test.

[…]

41. However, in the circumstances of this case, the public interest against disclosure is that in avoiding prejudice to international relations, specifically UK/Kingdom of Saudi Arabia relations. The relevant considerations in reaching a judgement on the balance of the public interest therefore extend beyond the actual content of the withheld information itself.

42. In the Commissioner’s view it is strongly in the public interest that the UK maintains good international relations. He considers that it would not be in the public interest if there were to be a negative impact on the effective conduct of international relations as a result of the release of the information at issue in this case.

43. From the evidence he has seen, the Commissioner is satisfied that disclosure of the withheld information represents a significant and real risk to the UK’s relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In his view, it is clear that disclosure in this case would not only damage the UK’s relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on this issue, but has the potential to harm the relationship between the two Governments across a range of issues. The Commissioner is satisfied that such a broad prejudicial outcome is firmly against the public interest and he has therefore concluded that the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.

44. In light of that conclusion, the Commissioner has not gone on to consider the FCO’s application of section 27(2) to the same information. He accepts, however, that the issue of any breach of confidentiality in this case is very closely related to the damage which would be caused to relations between the UK and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”

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The story of the unfortunate MoJ and Saudi commercial proposal

This is the background story to my ongoing posts at the FT about the unfortunate contract proposal from the UK government to the government of Saudi Arabia, and what the deal tells us about who really has power in – and over – the UK polity.

It is an unfinished story at the moment, as it is not yet known if the transaction will actually take place; no final decision on the contract has been made.

But what is known and in the public domain already is bad enough.

For example, the relevant UK government department over the last couple of weeks has had to admit to misinforming both the House of Commons and the High Court about the relevant procurement exercise, and it would seem no official – or minister – at the department has an overall grasp of what is going on.

And now it seems now the government department itself is not in control of its own contract proposal, as it appears that the only reason for the bid continuing is political pressure from other government departments.

It is a remarkable – and revealing – situation.

*

The MoJ commercial proposal

The government department involved is, of course, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ).

The contract proposal is for the MoJ to provide training services to the prison service of Saudi Arabia.

The value of the contract is reported to be £5.9 million.

The contract is to be let on a “commercial basis” – that is, the intention is for the MoJ to make a profit, rather than to just cover its costs.

The services to be provided seem to be the time and supposed expertise of MoJ civil servants (all of whom are, of course, funded by the UK taxpayer).

In effect, the MoJ wants to make money out of selling UK state resources to the Saudis.

*

Why the MoJ commercial proposal is wrong

Stepping back, it is obvious that this proposal is odd and wrong in a number of ways.

First, is a strange reversal to the usual approach to public sector contracting, which is that the state is the purchaser from a supplier; here, it is the government itself purporting to be a supplier to a customer.

Second, it should not be the business of the civil service to be selling “commercial” services to non-UK purchasers; the job of the civil service is to administer public services as, well, public servants.

Third, it certainly should not be the role of the MoJ, of all UK departments, to seek to have any commercial relationship with the government of Saudi Arabia.

And this is because of a matter of basic principle.

The MoJ is responsible for the integrity of the court system of England and Wales; indeed, the ministerial head of the department – the grandly titled Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice – has a constitutional duty recognised by statute to uphold the “rule of law”.

The Saudi Arabian state, on the other hand, has repeatedly sought to undermine the UK legal system.

The ongoing attempts by the Saudis to disrupt the legal system are well documented.

The most notable example, though not the only one, was the subject of the notorious Corner House case, which set out how the Saudis had bullied the UK government into dropping a fraud prosecution of BAe.

Anyone interested in seeing the extent of Saudi influence over the UK government and how it seeks to frustrate due process should read the first 22 descriptive paragraphs of the 2008 decision of House of Lords.

Following Corner House, it should be simply unthinkable for the Saudis to be given any commercial sway over the MoJ, or any other part of the domestic legal system – and although £5.9 million is not a lot of money for the Saudis, it is a significant amount for a MoJ under pressure to reduce spending.

And fourth, it is a revolting notion that the UK should be assisting any part of the Saudi punishment system to be more efficient.

The Saudi regime is, without any exaggeration, barbaric. Criminal offences are not defined; there is no recognisable due process for defendants; and the punishments are savage. And this description is not just some hyperbole of a breathless human rights lawyer: it is what the UK embassy in Riyadh itself says in its chilling Information Pack for British Prisoners in Saudi ArabiaOn punishments, the guide says:

Criminal law punishments in Saudi Arabia include public beheading, stoning, amputation and lashings. Serious criminal offences include not only internationally recognized crimes such as murder, rape, theft and robbery, but also apostasy, adultery, witchcraft and sorcery. In addition to the regular police force, Saudi Arabia has a secret police, the Mabahith, and “religious” police, the Mutawa. The Saudi courts impose a number of severe physical punishments. The death penalty can be imposed for a wide range of offences including murder, rape, armed robbery, repeated drug use, apostasy, adultery, witchcraft and sorcery and can be carried out by beheading with a sword, stoning or firing squad, followed by crucifixion.

What one is told by our embassy about what happens in the courtroom is not encouraging:

There is no jury system in Saudi Arabia. Trials are heard by a judge. They rely largely, and at times solely, on police reports and there is no guarantee that your pleas will be discussed. If a decision is taken by the Ministry of Interior or the Public Prosecutor’s office to send an individual before a Sharia court the procedures are very different from those in the UK. The court consists of a judge, the court clerk and a prosecutor from the Public Prosecutor’s office. The Judge will read the file prepared by the Police, the Public Prosecutor’s office and a statement made by the defendant. He will then ask a few questions from those involved and reach a decision. You will be allowed to have a lawyer represent you in court but he will not be allowed to cross examine witnesses or argue about statements presented by the either the police or the Public Prosecutor.

But you do not have to go to a UK embassy pamphlet to get a sense of the barbarity of the Saudi punishment; you just have to look at news media.

Cases of dire inhumanity by the Saudi state are a commonplace.

This week, for example, the Saudis are seeking to behead a seventeen year-old; and if executing a minor was not sickening enough, the plan by the Saudi authorities is to then have the boy’s corpse crucified.

This is not a punishment regime any western liberal democracy should be seeking to make more efficient.

*

The problem within MoJ

So how did the MoJ get into this unfortunate position?

The answer is depressing; the MoJ’s civil servants appear to have blundered into bidding for the Saudi prisons contract and nobody at the department had the wit or sense to stop them before it got too far.

This was not knavery; it was more collective foolishness within a dysfunctional government department.

And it was not only the Saudis to whom MoJ civil servants were seeking to sell services on a commercial basis; there were to be contracts with despots around the world.

No regime in the world seems to be too nasty. As I have described previously, the self-appointed unit which undertook this activity – “Just Solutions international” (JSi) – was “an exercise in amateurism and obfuscation, with civil servants toying with high-value international service contracts”.

One of many commendable things which the new Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary Michael Gove has done since taking over the MoJ in May is to order that JSi will cease to operate.

(This decision by Gove is one of a number of reversals of what happened previously at the MoJ which are discussed by Joshua Rozenberg in a recent insightful article.)

Gove quite properly insists that the focus of the work of MoJ civil servants should the courts, prisons, and probation services they are actually responsible for.

The global gallivanting has come to an end.

But bringing the antics of the JSi to a full conclusion has proved hard to do in practice. My last FT post on the MoJ and JSi was published on 11 September 2015, just after there had been a parliamentary statement saying that although JSi was to be closed down, the Saudi contract bid had to continue.

The natural and ordinary meaning of the explanation then given for the continuation by the MoJ was that Saudi “financial penalties” meant that the bid could not be withdrawn.

As my last FT post noted, this did not seem right. And, when officials at the MoJ double-checked, it turned out not to be right.

If the “financial penalties” could have applied at all (and that is still not clear), they were out-of-date. In an elementary error, the civil servants briefing the minister who made the parliamentary statement had got basic information wrong.

And so parliament was misinformed (or, in truth, misled) and the MoJ had to formally correct the ministerial statement. And such corrections are not done lightly by government departments.

The MoJ even went further than a formal correction; in an accompanying letter to the MP (who had nominally asked the question to which the ministerial statement was in the form of an answer), the MoJ made plain it was its own officials who were to blame for the misinformation:

I am writing to inform you of a correction to my answer to your parliamentary question on Just Solutions international (JSi).

My answer stated: “Following the submission of a final bid in April 2015, [theNational Offender Management Service] is now liable for financial penalties should the bid be withdrawn.”

This sentence was incorrect. In fact NOMS is only liable for financial penalties in the event of a withdrawal for a “validity period” of four months after the submission of the final bid in April. This period ended on 21 August meaning NOMS is no longer subject to financial penalties. I have asked officials for a full explanation as to why incorrect information was provided first to ministers and then to parliament through a written answer. It is clearly unacceptable for incorrect information to be given to parliament and I apologise unreservedly for this error. The parliamentary records will be corrected and I will be placing a copy of this letter in the House [of Commons] library.

So what?

What does this error matter?

It is significant in two ways.

First, it showed that even ministers and their private offices at the MoJ were not being given reliable information by officials in respect of potentially crucial information which could have influenced decision making on a controversial and high value contract with a barbaric regime.

But second, it meant that the fig-leaf of the “financial penalties” excuse for continuing with the bid fell away, and exposed something more worrying: the MoJ is now being forced into carrying on with the contract proposal, regardless of Gove’s desire to cease such activities at his department.

It is no longer a decision just for the MoJ (even though back in January, the MoJ press office assured journalists that “if the Saudi Government decided to offer NOMS the contract…the Secretary of State would have the opportunity to review the earlier decision in the light of current issues and considerations. The final decision may be to continue to contract (should it be offered) or to withdraw from the process)”.

The hands of the Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary have been tied by government colleagues.

And it was not only ministers and the House of Commons which have been misled by officials.

A few days after the MoJ admitted to misinforming parliament, another interesting and potentially significant error was revealed.

The ministerial statement had stated that the final bid to the Saudis had been made in April.

But this contradicted what the MoJ’s lawyers had told the High Court in defending the spirited judicial review of JSi brought by the Gulf Center for Human Rights. Government lawyers incorrectly told the court that the final bid was made in February.

Again, a mix-up of dates may seem unimportant.  But in the context of litigation, such dates can be crucial, especially in cases relating to commercial and procurement matters.

In essence, the more stale the procurement stage, the less likely a court will be minded to grant a remedy.

And, in any case, the High Court should not be given false information. So, as with the House of Commons, the MoJ has had to formally write to the High Court to correct a mistake and apologise in respect of information which the MoJ should not have got wrong.

The Gulf Center for Human Rights has said that the judicial review is continuing – and this week the experienced judicial review judge Mr Justice Supperstone granted the Gulf Center for Human Rights a protective costs order, saying that he was satisfied that that claim raised a matter of public importance which the public interest requires to be resolved.

Misinforming both the House of Commons and the High Court are serious matters, and that it has happened is indicative of the ineptness of the MoJ in respect of a major contract bid.

But what is far more serious is that the MoJ is being obliged to continue with the proposal.

*

The “wider interests” of government, and the interests of Saudi Arabia

In the same ministerial letter to the MP that corrected the point about “financial penalties”, the MoJ goes on to say:

I should stress that this does not affect the decisions either to choose JSi or to proceed with the training needs analysis bid. As my original answer stated, the bid will proceed because the Government decided withdrawing from the Saudi bid at this late stage would be detrimental to the HMG’s wider interests. Although ministers considered the implications of potential financial penalties during their decision-making process, the critical factor was the strong view from across government that withdrawing at such an advanced stage would harm HMG’s broader engagement with the Kingdon of Saudi Arabia.

The passage is subtle; but the only sensible meaning of the passage is that the MoJ is being pressed into continuing by other government departments. Over at Buzzfeed, the estimable Alan White reports:

Seven days ago, Grayling’s successor, Michael Gove – said by insiders to strongly oppose the notion that Britain should enter into such commercial contracts with despotic regimes – announced that JSI would be wound up.

However, a £5.9 million contract to advise Saudi Arabian prison system on training needs will still be delivered.

BuzzFeed News understands that Gove wanted to terminate the entire contract but this was blocked by other government departments who feared that it would damage relations with the Saudis.

White is nobody’s fool as a journalist, and his description of Gove’s sentiments is likely to be well-sourced and correct.

It would accord with the robust wording of the ministerial statement and the letter to the MP.

And it is also consistent with Gove closing down JSi.

So it is probably not just MoJ spin that Gove and his department want distance from the contract: the evidence is that the department is clearly being made to do something it no longer wants to do.

But who are these “wider” government interests?

Nobody in government is willing to say at the moment, but a look back at the history of JSi is suggestive.

As I set out back in February, JSi is referred to (though not named) in the UKTI Security Exports Strategy of 2014 (host web page), which contains the following paragraph:

Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and National Offender Management Service (NOMS) Supports capacity for design and prison build across overseas prison services. Provides justice assistance consultancy services alongside learning and development opportunities and interventions via the Prison Service training college… NOMS will work with UKTI to identify trade opportunities arising from this work.

And back in 9 October 2013, Gove’s hopeless predecessor Chris Grayling referred to JSi in a speech to the World Probation Congress, where he said:

We are committed to supporting those countries in the development of their criminal justice systems, working in liaison with UK Trade and Investments, the Department for International Developments and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

It is not really that difficult to see that the “wider” government interests forcing the MoJ to continue with this misconceived and illiberal proposal are UK Trade and Investments, the Department for International Developments, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

And in turn, it is not difficult to see why the FCO in particular would not want the MoJ to be so discourteous as to withdraw from a Saudi procurement exercise. The Saudis are, after all, key strategic allies of the UK. This is not the least thing the UK does to appease a regime with one of the most dreadful human rights records in the world.

*

Conclusions

The proposed MoJ deal is now an ugly mess.

The proposal is wrong in principle; and it is now unwanted by the MoJ.

The proposal offers the Saudis a commercial grip over the very department responsible for the same legal system which the Saudis have repeatedly sought to undermine (as set out, for example, in Corner House).

It also means the prospect of UK civil servants using UK taxpayer funded resources to help make more efficient one of the most vile and brutal punishment regimes in the world.

It is a distraction from what the MoJ should be doing.

It is therefore as wrong a transaction as one can imagine; there is nothing good to be said for it.

But yet, such is the importance of keeping the UK’s ally Saudi Arabia happily on side that somehow there is a power greater than anything which can be said against it.

Parliament and ministers and the courts may all be misled but the deal must continue, lest the Saudis be upset with the UK.

For the UK government as a whole, it would seem that the integrity of the domestic justice system and international human rights priorities are but loads on one side of the set of international policy scales, and they are outweighed by the interests of Saudi Arabia on the other side.

In essence, the UK government’s “wider” interests appear to be nothing other than the interests of Saudi Arabia.

*

ADD, 26th September 2015

This post prompted some positive responses on Twitter:

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MoJ refuses to disclose details of its commercial proposal to the Saudi state

The below has been received from the Ministry of Justice. It is a refusal to disclose anything to do with the MoJ’s proposal to provide services on a commercial basis to the Saudi state.

Freedom of Information Request

Dear Mr Green,

 Thank you for your email of 16 January in which you requested the following information from the Ministry of Justice:

Can I please have all documents relating to the proposal of NOMS to the Saudi Arabian government referred to at page 6 ofhttps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/391930/ministry-of-justice-mid-year-report-to-parliament-2014-15.pdf

Please can I have all documents provided to and from a Minister in respect of the above proposal.

Your request has been handled under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

I can confirm that the Ministry of Justice holds information that you have requested, but in this case we will not be providing it to you as it is exempt from disclosure under section 41(1) and section 43(2) of the Act.

Section 41(1)

The information held by the Ministry of Justice includes documents supplied in confidence by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in relation to the proposal, and we believe that their disclosure would create an actionable breach of confidence. We are not obliged to provide information that has been provided in confidence to the department (section 41(1) of the Act). The terms of this exemption in the Act mean that we do not have to consider whether or not it would be in the public interest for you to have the information.

Section 43(2)

The Ministry of Justice is not obliged to provide information where we believe that disclosing the information would be likely to prejudice the commercial interests of any person including the department which holds it (section 43(2) of the Act).

In particular, the Ministry of Justice is in an ongoing competitive process with its proposal to the KSA, and the bid and related documents contain commercially confidential information. Disclosure of the information would be likely to disrupt the negotiation process and have an adverse impact on the bid.

In line with the terms of this exemption in the Freedom of Information Act, we have also considered whether it would be in the public interest for us to provide you with the information, despite the exemption being applicable. When assessing whether or not it was in the public interest to disclose the information to you, we took into account the following factors:

Public interest considerations favouring disclosure

There is a public interest in knowing how and why the Ministry of Justice enters into commercial relations with overseas countries and which countries these are.

Public interest considerations favouring withholding the information

Disclosure would be likely to prejudice the commercial interests of the Ministry of Justice by affecting adversely:

– its negotiating position in the ongoing Just Solutions International (JSi) bid process with KSA;

– the prospects of a successful outcome for the JSi bid with KSA due to the likely negative impact that would result from disclosure on the evaluation of the bid by the Saudi Arabian authorities; and

– future commercial (JSi) bids with other overseas governments and agencies seeking justice assistance from JSi if details of the Saudi Arabian bid were disclosed which, in turn, is likely to have a detrimental effect on the future commercial prospects for JSi.

We have concluded that, on balance, the public interest is better served by withholding this information under section 43(2).

You can find out more about sections 41 and 43 by reading the extracts from the Act, and some guidance points we consider when applying these exemptions, at the end of this letter.

You can also find more information by reading the full text of the Act, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/contents.

You have the right to appeal our decision if you think it is incorrect. Details can be found in the How to Appeal section at the end of this letter.

Disclosure Log

​You can also view information that the Ministry of Justice has disclosed in response to previous Freedom of Information requests. Responses are anonymised and published on our online disclosure log which can be found on the MoJ website:https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-justice/series/freedom-of-information-disclosure-log.

Yours sincerely

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